


② LEVEL

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

ADA057908

AD No. _____
DDC FILE COPY



THESIS

ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: ENVIRONMENTAL
PRESSURES, THE MILITARY SETTING, AND
THE ULTIMATE TEST

BY

William Don Langford

June 1978


Thesis Advisor:

R. A. McGonigal

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

88 08 23 030

DISCLAIMER NOTICE



THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST
QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY
FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED
A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF
PAGES WHICH DO NOT
REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.

REPRODUCED FROM
BEST AVAILABLE COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Organizational Development: Environmental Pressures, The Military Setting, And The Ultimate Test.		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis June 1978
7. AUTHOR(s) William Don Langford		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		9. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		12. REPORT DATE June 1978 13. NUMBER OF PAGES 76
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED 15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited ⑨ Master's thesis, ⑫ 75 p.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Organizational Development (OD) Readiness Military Sociology Final Combat Effectiveness Military History Civil Support Combat Productive Organizations Organizational Effectiveness (OE) All-Volunteer Force		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Many on-going actions are in progress to maintain an effective military establishment. One such action has been in the area of Organizational Development (OD). The three major services, the Air Force, Navy, and Army have generated programs which, in theory employ the technology of Organizational Development. The goals of these OD efforts all purport to improve organizational functioning in the areas of efficiency, effectiveness, and in-		

DD FORM 1 JAN 73 1473

EDITION OF 1 NOV 68 IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0102-014-6801

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)
78 08 23 600

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE/When Data Entered

Item 20 (continued)

total combat readiness. These military OD programs are in various stages of institutionalization. Because of their growing size and influence, it is felt to be an appropriate time to evaluate their usefulness. The ultimate test for the effectiveness of a military unit is, of course, under combat conditions. Unfortunately, there is little precedent to say that OD in the military is good or bad under the stress of combat. This thesis provides a context for looking at OD in the military by analyzing the environmental pressures, the current OD effort, and considers the use of OD under combat conditions. It identifies the likely benefits, the potential dangers of using such a change approach, and makes recommendations on how to accomplish the goal of improving organizational functioning using OD consultants under combat conditions.

Item 19 (continued)

Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officer (OESO)
Training and Management
Stress

APPROVAL		
BY	DATE	SECTION
WBS	DATE	SECTION
REVIEWED/COPIED		
NOTIFICATION		
CERTIFICATION/AVAILABILITY CODE		
1-4	AVAIL	1-4
A		

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

Organizational Development: Environmental
Pressures, The Military Setting, And
The Ultimate Test

by

William Don Langford
Captain, United States Army
B.S., Clemson University, 1968

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 1978

Author

William D. Langford

Approved by

Richard C. L. Gougeon

Thesis Advisor

Raymond L. Feltus

Second Reader

John A. Schrade

Chairman, Department of Administrative Sciences

John A. Schrade

Dean of Information and Policy Sciences

ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: ENVIRONMENTAL PRESSURES
THE MILITARY SETTING, AND THE ULTIMATE TEST

ABSTRACT

Many on-going actions are in progress to maintain an effective military establishment. One such action has been in the area of Organizational Development (OD). The three major services, the Air Force, Navy, and Army have generated programs which, in theory employ the technology of Organizational Development. The goals of these OD efforts all purport to improve organizational functioning in the areas of efficiency, effectiveness, and in total combat readiness. These military OD programs are in various stages of institutionalization. Because of their growing size and influence, it is felt to be an appropriate time to evaluate their usefulness. The ultimate test for the effectiveness of a military unit is, of course, under combat conditions. Unfortunately, there is little precedent to say that OD in the military is good or bad under the stress of combat. This thesis provides a context for looking at OD in the military by analyzing the environmental pressures, the current OD effort, and considers the use of OD under combat conditions. It identifies the likely benefits, the potential dangers of using such a change approach, and makes recommendations on how to accomplish the goal of improving organizational functioning using OD consultants under combat conditions.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION -----	8
A.	OVERVIEW -----	8
B.	ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE MILITARY SERVICE -----	9
C.	SUMMARY -----	11
II.	REVIEW OF THOSE DISCIPLINES WHOSE THEORIES CONTRIBUTE TO UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN COMBAT -----	13
A.	OVERVIEW -----	13
1.	Military Sociology -----	14
2.	Military History -----	15
3.	Contributions From Economics And Social Psychology -----	16
4.	Organizational Development -----	16
5.	Summary -----	17
B.	MILITARY SOCIOLOGY -----	17
C.	MILITARY HISTORY -----	28
1.	Combat Creates Fear -----	30
2.	A General Reluctance to Expend Firepower During Combat -----	31
3.	Changes in Behavior of Individuals in a Combat Zone -----	31
4.	Feeling of Superiority Over the Enemy -----	31
5.	Lack of Political Affiliation -----	32
6.	Group Cohesion as a Motivator -----	32
D.	CONTRIBUTIONS FROM ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY -----	34

E.	ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT -----	40
III.	STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM -----	51
A.	SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE -----	52
B.	THE IDEAL SETTING -----	52
C.	THE BASIC PROBLEM -----	54
IV.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS -----	61
A.	CONCLUSION -----	61
B.	ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS -----	61
1.	The Decision Not to Use OD Principles or OESOs in Combat -----	61
2.	The Decision to Use OD and OESOs But Abandon the Effort Should It Prove Ineffective or Dsyfunctional -----	62
3.	Demand That OD Principles and OESOs Be Used in Combat -----	63
C.	HOW OESOs MIGHT BE USED IN COMBAT -----	64
D.	SUMMARY -----	69
E.	RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH -----	69
	BIBLIOGRAPHY -----	71
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST -----	75

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author gratefully acknowledges the guidance of Cdr Richard A. McGonigal, USN, of the Department of Administrative Sciences of the Naval Postgraduate School. Cdr McGonigal stimulated the author's interest in the subject and was instrumental in the development of the contents of this thesis. The author also personally thanks Lcdr Raymond L. Forbes of the Department of Administrative Sciences for his valuable advice and assistance. Special recognition also goes to the author's wife, Ann, for her encouragement, motivation, and typing the numerous rough drafts and final copy.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. OVERVIEW

The United States Department of Defense is presently investing 53 million dollars a year in pay for its human resources [Ref. 9, p. xi]. In addition, the separate military services have initiated costly programs which have been implemented under the rubric of Organizational Development (OD). A possibility does exist that the substantial investment in these programs will be lost because these programs will be abandoned in the event of war. This thesis will present an argument that these programs are beneficial in their present state but that their greatest potential value can best be realized by projecting and planning for their use under combat conditions.

Military OD programs, as they presently exist, are oriented toward improving organizational functioning by concentrating on the interpersonal and group dynamics of their individual members. This process is time consuming and may be a severe constraint under combat conditions. However, OD consultants can still serve a useful purpose in combat by assisting the organization in processing the information so uniquely different in combat. This thesis reviews the publication of several eminent sociologists, briefly covers the separate military services OD programs, and

attempts to go beyond the past and the present and predict what OD programs, practices, and techniques might be employed under the dynamic conditions of combat.

B. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE MILITARY SERVICE

Organizational Development has been a popular name in the civilian world for several years. OD has become a field in its own right developed through contributions from the disciplines of psychology, sociology, business administration, philosophy, political science, and other recognized approaches [Ref. 20, p. 15]. Some theorists consider it to be a logical expansion of neoclassical organizational theory (the human relations movement). This is typified by Hicks who writes: "For the first time industrial organizations were recognized as not merely economic systems but also social ones with important internal social dynamics [Ref. 20, p. 204].

The human relations approach has now been applied in business and industrial settings for several decades. Whether OD is an extension of human relations or is now a separate discipline is a moot argument and is of little importance when defending OD as a method of improving an organization. Perhaps OD's greatest contribution to organizational thought is that it takes the different management philosophies out of a normative, theoretical setting and puts these management philosophies into a practical setting. The organization development process

allows constructive change to take place through the individuals who comprise the organization.

In reality, organizational change accomplished through an OD program may have modified few organizational functions. Nonetheless it is often perceived by the individuals within an organization as an activity which has made the climate and interpersonal relationships better. The whole OD process is typically complicated and time consuming. Adequate evidence does exist to indicate that OD does improve organizational functioning by focusing attention on how a group works together and ". . . what else is going on as the task is being worked on"[Ref. 15, p. 101]. This process improves morale, motivation, productivity, and the organizational climate.

In the military, this is precisely what OD is trying to accomplish: to improve organizational functioning by concentrating on improving the individuals and group processes within an organization. Additionally, OD recognizes the simple fact that it is people who make organizational systems work no matter how complicated or automated their product or service may be. However, several hundred years of tradition seem to indicate that the modus operandi of any military service is beset with autocratic and bureaucratic mechanisms which are dysfunctional in terms of personal motivation and achievement. Today, the military services are attempting to change their image because this is seen as one way they can attract and retain qualified personnel.

The basic premises of this thesis are that (1) social change is inevitable and (2) that the separate military services have traditionally been resistant to any change that is accomplished too quickly. A fundamental question is why should there be any change at all in the military? After all in the view of many persons, the United States has never officially lost a war or succumbed to an enemy under unfavorable terms. Additionally, US military forces have been historically effective in carrying out their assigned defense mission. If the services are effective, why should they change?

One rationale in support of the need for change is to maintain the military as a representative social institution. In this view society has representative values and these social values should be reflected in the military. The national society is the usual source of the military's most valuable asset--its people. A subtle example of military values being incongruous with civilian values would be the recent attempts to unionize the armed forces. Trade unionism is an accepted part of our larger society. An example of the contrast between societal and military values in collision is seen in the military's dread of even discussing military unions.

C. SUMMARY

Virtually all the major military services of the United States have instituted programs which purport to improve

organizational effectiveness and efficiency. These programs have been viewed as successful in varying degrees. What has been the cost of their successes? Let's question the basis for these programs by first recognizing two very important constraints. First is the advent of the all-volunteer force. Secondly, the decreasing numbers of eligible males that constitute the military resource pool dictates that some changes will be required to sustain the required personnel strength of the military of the future. Improving organizational functioning is the stated goal of military organizational development programs. The author contends, however, that these programs are primarily an attempt to bring military values into line with society's values while recognizing various operable constraints. The degree of success of these OD programs will help determine whether the military services will be able to maintain the required quantity and quality of their personnel. Desired personnel levels must be achieved within the all-volunteer framework without returning to a conscription system or the services being forced into a disadvantageous bargaining posture because of military union activity by their members.

II. REVIEW OF THOSE DISCIPLINES WHOSE THEORIES CONTRIBUTE TO UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN COMBAT

A. OVERVIEW

Organizational Development literature dealing specifically with the military environment is scanty at best in comparison with the increasing number of publications which are oriented toward the civilian environment. Military publications, in the form of papers, articles, and reports predominately deal with the integration of OD theory into the military setting. A principal limitation is that these publications fall short of dealing with the more dynamic implications of Organizational Development in a combat environment. To develop a proper climate to analyze the problem of OD in combat, three distinctly separate areas were researched. These areas or disciplines which form the basis of this thesis are: Sociology, Military History, and Organizational Development. In addition to the three disciplines listed, an attempt is made to integrate the results of research published in technical reports, primarily from the fields of economics and social psychology, to assist decision makers in policy formulation and implementation effecting the all-volunteer force.

1. Military Sociology

The writings of Charles Moskos, Morris Janowitz, and Samuel Stouffer and others were used to help define the US military in the context of a total society.¹ The impact of their research and publications is paramount because they are able to describe both the civilian and the military communities, the similarities, the dissimilarities, and most importantly the consequences of continuing the divergent trends of each entity. The findings and predictions of military sociologists are not limited to the present. The historical framework of this thesis concentrates on the past thirty-five years and includes sociological studies of World War II, the Korean War, and to a limited degree, the war in Vietnam. Several recurrent themes continue to emerge. First, without a conscription system, the US military does not proportionally represent the racial and class distinctions of the American society in general. Secondly, the military institution, no matter what the social make-up, markedly contrasts with civilian structures and values. Lastly, because of the sheer differences in numbers, the military institution should adjust to society's values in general rather than vice versa.

¹ The author feels that special contributions came from Morris Janowitz's The Professional Soldier, Sociology and The Military Environment, and The US Forces and the Zero Draft; Charles Moskos's The American Enlisted Man, and "The Emergent Military: Civil, Traditional, or Plural?"; and Samuel Stouffer's The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life.

2. Military History

Extensive readings in military history were undertaken in support of this thesis in an attempt to discover whether individual values and attitudes toward war have changed over time. The primary research in this area was oriented toward the writings of S. L. A. Marshall, John Keegan, and J. Glenn Gray.² These three authors were selected because their writings go beyond the terrain, tactics, weather, weapons, and the logistics and deal with the individual's fear, feelings, and frustrations of being closely engaged with an enemy. S. L. A. Marshall is a noted American military historian and his writings include World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. It is interesting to note that the tactical nature of each of these wars is significantly different; however, the personal dynamics of the individual participants is remarkably consistent. Among these consistencies, allegiance to the preservation of self and peers takes precedence over mission accomplishment and organizational survival in the combat environment. The challenge, in an OD framework, is how can the individual values and

² Special contributions came from S. L. A. Marshall's Battle at Best, The Military History of the Korean War, Ambush, and Battles in the Monsoon; John Keegan's The Face of Battle; and J. Glenn Gray's The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle.

group processes be improved and integrated into an environment where individual, group, and organizational norms and goals are all consistent.

3. Contributions from Economics and Social Psychology

Department of Defense and other government agencies spend millions of dollars annually for research conducted by civilian corporations and educational institutions. This research is normally published in the form of technical reports but is usually oriented toward specific issues such as cost or other variables which effect the military. Most technical reports attempt to quantify costs of alternatives but rarely analyze these alternatives in the framework of how other variables might be effected. Fairly extensive reference will be made to the findings of these reports in this thesis because they are usually more current, usually are quantifiable, and represent the latest methods in research using many different academic disciplines and computer modeling. While there is some effort to provide widest dissemination, these technical reports rarely are used outside of the proponent agency sponsoring the research.

4. Organizational Development

In the past several years, numerous articles and textbooks have been published by OD theorists and practitioners. While these writings are fairly extensive, an universally agreed model or theory has not emerged. OD is

multi-faceted in that it deals with an organization's problems from an individual, team, intergroup, or total organization level. This thesis will present several situations in which the combat environment is significantly different from an environment where little danger is present. These situations will be diagnosed in terms of what is the needed change and how it could be accomplished using OD approaches, techniques, and consultants.

5. Summary

There is no doubt the integrating of military sociology, military history, economic and physical constraints, and Organizational Development is a rather ambitious undertaking. This thesis does not intend to be all-inclusive but rather is an attempt to show that all of these variables have a significant impact on the future of the US military. The military OD programs are presently oriented toward a stable, stateside, and static environment. This thesis suggests that their greatest potential could be measured in human lives saved in combat.

B. MILITARY SOCIOLOGY

Many academic disciplines attempt to explain or increase understanding of organizations and individuals within an organization. Sociology is certainly no exception. The normative and descriptive nature of sociological writings contribute to the increased understanding of mankind and

our relationship with our environment. However, these writings are primarily historically oriented. This historical orientation, while usually sound, does not provide for accurate predictions about man and his relationship with the society in the future. Individual values change and societal values are constantly changing but usually at a very slow rate.

Sociologists frequently are tasked with analyzing probable future events or alternatives which impact on changes being considered in the present. This extrapolation of the future causes sociological analysis to be principally subjective. The analysis is usually based on an underlying set of static assumptions. "The social scientist sees the professional soldier as dogmatic. As a result, the approach of the social scientist to the military establishment has been segmental and technical, rather than comprehensive and scientific" [Ref. 24, p. 31].

The analysis is further compounded because individual reactions change as the number of different races, religions, nationalities change. The result of this complex change process is the lack of a universally applied model which can be used to understand all mankind. Perhaps this lack of agreement serves a useful purpose. Sociological research is typically an attempt to place events and conditions in a conceptual framework which is reflective of the social variable being investigated. The trend in sociological analysis is to address issues which can be understood by all, not just one segment of a small portion of society.

Despite the resistance toward concentrating on small elements within our society, military sociology has emerged as a separate discipline within sociology [Ref. 26, p. 9]. The reasons are beginning to become obvious. First, there is an increasing analytical trend toward evaluating human variables and their effect on organizational functioning. The US military is beginning to integrate human factors into their planning and to study various types of organizational structures. Second, research methodology is becoming sophisticated where these variables under study can be better quantified. This new found sophistication provides a degree of acceptance to research findings formerly lacking within the scientific community. These findings are now becoming increasingly objective rather than subjective in their basic character.

A review of the literature of military sociology reveals what appears to be very explicit and accurate reporting of human factors which affect the US military. For example, the following findings were reported by Samuel Stouffer, et al:

The Army was a new world for most civilian soldiers. Of its many contrasts with civilian institutions, three may be cited:

1. Its authoritarian organization, demanding rigid obedience.
2. Its highly stratified social system, in which hierarchies of difference were formally and minutely established by official regulation, subject to penalties for infraction on and off duty.
3. Its emphasis on traditional ways of doing things and its discouragement of initiative [Ref. 42, p. 55].

Stouffer further reports on how the soldier viewed these authoritarian methods:

1. That many of those exercising authority were unqualified for their job.
2. That the soldier did not get enough chance to learn the "reason why" of orders.
3. That authority was exercised as if those in authority assumed a very low level of intelligence on the part of trainees [Ref. 42, p. 65].

What is interesting about the above reported findings is that they were published in 1949. Ironically, it is likely that many personnel still serving on active duty along with those who have been discharged would say that the above conditions still exist in the military services today. Whether this is actually true or not is of little practical significance because it is perceived by a large segment of the population as being true. One possible implication is that there has been little or no change in the popular perception of the military during the past thirty years.

One likely reason for this lack of change is the deeply ingrained bureaucratic system. This bureaucratic orientation, coupled with a mandatory service obligation have combined to foster the static perception of the military. Mere entry and the first act of oath of enlistment have often meant adaption to a distinctly different set of values. These two factors have also initiated a primary sense of allegiance to military authority. Only the federal constitution takes precedence over the authority of the military orders which serve to make the system work.

Another prime reason why changes have not taken place within the military is reported by Stouffer. His findings suggest that any changes to the use of principally authoritarian methods of compliance were not rewarded. Lastly, the military system is considered to be too large to be effected by any change such as a modification of the authority subsystem. The military organizational structure is essentially monolithic and bureaucratic. There is probably not going to be any rapid changes in the size and structure of the military which would alleviate the perceptions of the exercising of authority and the stultifying of innovativeness.

"The US moves to an all-volunteer force in the context of the most extensive anti-military sentiment in its recent history" [Ref. 23, p. 4]. Conscription is lost to us as an alternative. It appears that when the social cost to obtain the required quantity of personnel to support the required manning level becomes excessive, the military services need to start looking for alternative ways of operating internally. It is this internal pressure for change which should work toward altering the current derogatory impressions into positive impressions of the military environment. The efforts to change internally seem thus far to have been given only token attention. However, the lack of internal change is beginning to be felt in terms of the quantity and quality of service manpower. This, quite simply, is a clear example of the clash between the

expectations of the military and its larger society. This military personnel situation is beginning to effect virtually all non-communist nations under advanced industrialism.

. . . internally, the advanced industrial societies without totalitarian social control systems, higher levels of education and a more ample standard of mass consumption have led wide segments of the population to a diffuse but persistent reluctance to serve in the military. . . . Those who can be impressed into military service because of sheer poverty are fewer in number and marginal persons have the alternative benefits of the welfare state. Thus the introduction of an all-volunteer force does not solve the problems of military manpower, but rather under an all-volunteer force the number, quality, and professionalism of the military emerge as critical and persistent issues of national security [Ref. 23, p. 4-5].

The all-volunteer force in the US military has been in existence since fiscal year 1974 when conscription under the Selective Service Act was terminated. Since its inception, all the military services have had to adjust to a more competitive manpower availability situation. As quoted earlier, our defense manpower costs for 1977 were calculated at almost 53 billion dollars. Inflation, increased competition for scarce manpower caused by the ending of the draft, and a steadily decreasing supply of prime recruiting candidates, are projected to cause manpower costs to reach 61 billion dollars by 1985. In addition, the shortfall of available manpower is predicted to be 88,000 personnel (assuming low unemployment) or 53,000 personnel (assuming high unemployment) [Ref. 9, xi-xxiii].

A parallel can be drawn to this situation in 1985 with the present use of illegal aliens in US industry in 1978. Approximately 8 million illegal aliens are currently employed in American industry. However, the bulk of these alien workers are concentrated in the extreme lower end of the income scale. There is a market for illegal aliens because welfare for US citizens is a better economic alternative than being employed doing menial labor [Ref. 46, p. 80-81]. This situation, while apparently somewhat remote, is an extension of the sociological argument that the all-volunteer force increases the probability that enlisted ranks will be overrepresented by black and Spanish speaking elements [Ref. 23, p. 9].

Military sociologists frequently make reference to the constant state of change in organizations and organizational structures caused by the dynamic use of technological weapon systems. "While the interest in the human problems of new weapons is mainly physiological, it will ultimately be necessary to discover and re-discover the social elements in these weapons systems" [Ref. 24, p. 113]. "While new machines are likely to be better than old ones, constantly disrupted organizations are not necessarily more conducive to satisfactory primary group relations" [Ref. 24, p. 98].

The key result from these frequent organizational changes on the primary group relationship is a growing frustration. The increasingly technical nature of new weapons systems has brought about a shift in the occupational

distribution of enlisted positions. Table 1 presents a percentage distribution of changes that have occurred during the period 1945 to 1967. The implications for organizational theorists and organizational development practitioners in the future will be the man-machine relationship as well as the primary group relationships.³

Charles Moskos in his article, "The Emergent Military," presents an excellent summary of the all-volunteer force and the social conditions which will impact on the US military.

. . . the decline in status of the American military establishment may well be a part of a more pervasive pattern occurring through Western parliamentary democracies. Observers in contemporary armed forces in Western Europe, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia have all noted the sharp depreciation in the military's standing in these societies In other words, the American military, and its counterparts in other Western postindustrialized societies, is experiencing a historical turning point with regard to its societal legitimacy and public acceptance [Ref. 35, p. 260].

The decline in social status is not the only significant variable which effects the all-volunteer force. "One of the most telling arguments against the establishment of an

³ Credit for this theme is given to Moshe Davidowitz who conducted a Futuristics workshop at the Fall 1977 OD Network in San Diego, California. The basis for the man-machine relationship is found in an educational setting where the student has a personal interaction with a computer using computer assisted learning. The computer and student have a first name relationship. Research indicated that the computer-student relationship is as strong as or stronger than the student-family relationship.

TABLE 1

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ENLISTED POSITIONS,
SELECTED YEARS 1945-1967

<u>Occupation Group</u>	<u>Percent Distribution</u>			
	<u>1945</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1967</u>
Ground Combat	24.1	17.3	14.1	14.1
Electronics	5.8	9.5	14.2	14.7
Other Technical	7.2	7.3	8.1	7.7
Administrative and Clerical	15.3	20.6	19.9	18.4
Mechanics and Repairmen	20.0	22.3	24.5	26.1
Craftsmen	9.2	6.6	7.2	6.8
Services	16.6	15.4	11.9	12.0
Miscellaneous	1.9	--	--	--
Total <u>a/</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

a/ Rounded to 100.0 percent

Sources: Sheldon E. Haber, "Occupational Structure in the Military and Civilian Sectors of the Economy," Technical Report No. TR-1224, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, George Washington University, September 25, 1974.

all-volunteer force is that such a force will have an enlisted membership overwhelmingly black and poor" [Ref. 35, p. 262]. The enlisted ranks do not represent educational levels and intelligence levels which represent the general population.

- (a) non-high school graduates suffer a financial loss if they choose civilian employment over continued military service;
- (b) enlisted men who have attended college experience a financial loss if they remain in military service;
- (c) military and civilian earnings for high school graduates are roughly the same; and
- (d) military earnings for blacks with a high school education or less will far exceed their earnings in the civilian labor force.

In other words, on the assumption that social groups will generally behave in their own economic self-interest, an all volunteer force would significantly overdraw its membership from the less-educated and minority groups of American society [Ref. 35, p. 263].

This represents one of the most glaring inconsistencies of the all-volunteer force. Technology requires increasingly higher levels of mental capabilities yet, any level of military training beyond basic skills apparently only accelerates the rate at which military personnel return to the civilian work force.

The US Navy, Army, and Air Force have organizational development programs. These programs, while significantly different between the services, are all in varying stages of institutionalization. Institutionalization implies that their separate programs are normative and thus are applicable to all sub-organizations within each service. Yet, a comparison of civilian and military values reveals

there are many facets of both societal segments that are convergent, divergent, and pluralistic. Military and civilian structures seem to have been converging because of: (1) increased reliance on civilian skills to develop and maintain sophisticated weapon systems; (2) identical managerial skills; (3) greater consistency in youth values; and (4) life styles becoming increasingly oriented toward leisure.

Conversely, military and civilian structures are divergent and traditional because of: (1) increasing number of officers trained and educated in military academies; (2) decreasing number of upper and middle class in the enlisted ranks caused by the ending of the draft; (3) the military's move from a segregated to a totally integrated force structure; (4) a leveling off of the transferability of civilian and military skills; and (5) family need patterns (e.g. PXs, hospitals, commissarys, housing, schools, and dependent services) which tend to isolate the military family from the civilian community.

Another model can be represented which is called the plural military which is both divergent (traditional) and convergent in that it simultaneously projects organizational trends both civilian and traditional in nature. For example, a ground combat unit which is highly labor intensive will probably be traditional. Highly technical support functions (e.g. education, medical care, logistics, and maintenance) will more closely resemble the convergent or civilian features.

Clearly the institutionalization or normative approach to organizational development in the military is not always appropriate because values are different in the many sub-elements. The OD practitioner's greatest contribution to the military services could be in facilitating the new organizational forms needed for the pluralistic model and in helping develop personnel, military justice and discipline policies for the differing work ethos [Ref. 35, p. 255-277].

In summary,

A military force uniformly moving toward more recognition of individual rights and less rigidity in social control would in all likelihood seriously disaffect career personnel while making military service only marginally more palatable to its resistant members. A predominately traditional military, on the other hand, would most likely be incapable of either maintaining the organization at its required complexity or attracting the kind of membership necessary for effective performance. More ominous, a traditional military in a rapidly changing society could develop anti-civilian values tearing the basic fabric of democratic ideology [Ref. 35, p. 278].

C. MILITARY HISTORY

While the bombardment was knocking the trench to pieces at Fossalta, he lay very flat and sweated and prayed, "Oh Jesus Christ get me out of here. Dear Jesus, please get me out. Christ, please, please, please, Christ. If you'll only keep me from getting killed I'll do anything you say. I believe in you and I'll tell everybody in the world that you are the only thing that matters. Please, please, dear Jesus." The shelling moved further up the line. We went to work on the trench and in the morning the sun came up and the day was hot and muggy and cheerful and quiet. The next night back at Mestre he did not tell the girl he went upstairs with at the Villa Rossa about Jesus. And he never told anybody.

Ernest Hemingway [Ref. 19, p. 89].

"The subject matter of military sociology is best defined by reference to organized violence" [Ref. 26, p. 9]. Military history records how this organized violence is accomplished including the tactics, the strategy, the weapons, and the weapons systems. But, "by its choice of focus, automatically distorts perspective and too often dissolves into sycophancy or hero-worship, culminating in the odd case in a bizarre sort of identification by the author with his subject" [Ref. 25, p. 27].

This study of organizational development and its combat applications uses military history as a base because specific literature on combat applications of OD is limited.⁴ Additionally, military history is used as an integral part of this thesis because the dynamics of combat are sufficiently different from the non-combat environment and "the combat soldier . . . when committed to battle is hardly the model of Max Weber's ideal bureaucrat following rigid rules and regulations" [Ref. 24, p. 113]. The central theme, when attempting to draw a corollary between OD and military history, is that human processes still exist regardless of the type of situation. These human processes appear to be much more critical in a combat environment because the success of military operations and human lives are at stake.

⁴ The author found only two articles dealing specifically with combat applications of OD. Charles Greenbaum, et al, "The Military Psychologist During Wartime: A Model Based on Action Research and Crisis Intervention" and Gavriel Solomon's "Professional Dilemmas of the Psychologist in Organizational Emergency" were articles written about the application of OD during the Yom Kippur War of 1973.

S. L. A. Marshall and J. Glenn Gray are used as primary sources of reference. Not only do they graphically depict military history but, more importantly, the human processes which underscore the crucial nature of the group and group dynamics. These human aspects of combat are essential ingredients in military effectiveness. When the nature of the battle, the tactics, the maps, and many other traditional aspects of military history are removed from consideration, several recurrent themes emerge.

1. Combat Creates Fear

Both he (Marshall) and du Ploq believe that an army is a genuine social organism, governed by its own social laws, and that formal discipline, imposed from above, is of limited utility in getting men to fight . . . soldiers must develop a 'mutual acquaintanceship which establishes pride'-- sees the suppression of fear chiefly as the officer's task . . . fear is general among men, but to observe further that men are commonly loath that their fear will be expressed in specific acts which their comrades will recognize as cowardice. The majority are unwilling to take extraordinary risks and do not aspire to a hero's role, but they are equally unwilling that they should be considered the least worthy among those present . . . an army should foster the closest acquaintance among its soldiers, that it should seek to create groups of friends, centered if possible on someone identified as a 'natural' fighter, since it is their 'mutual acquaintanceship' which will ensure no one flinches or shirks. 'When a soldier is . . . known to the men who are around him, he . . . has reason to fear losing the one thing he is likely to value more highly than life--his reputation as a man among other men' [Ref. 25, p. 72-73].

Besides the obvious fear of personal extinction, there are strange fears associated with combat. Some of these

include the concern for sphincter control, what all of this is doing to one's career chances and what may or may not be happening to one's loved ones at home. (Concern for the latter may be much more quiescent in just a few minutes after engagement with the enemy.)

2. A General Reluctance to Expend Firepower During Combat

S. L. A. Marshall reports that there has been some improvement in the firepower expenditure rate for the American soldier since World War II, most notably in Korea and Vietnam. However, less than one-fourth of the troops actually fired their weapons in battle [Ref. 33, p. 15]. Toughened military leaders are shocked by this disparity.

3. Changes in Behavior of Individuals in a Combat Zone

There are many examples of this but perhaps the best example is the Hemingway quote at the beginning of this section. Another example is the sexual behavior of men in combat which has persisted for centuries. The principal sexual relationship is that of a conqueror to victim. However, this type of relationship seldom continues judging from the number of soldiers who return to the area of combat to find their prostitute and take her home as their wife [Ref. 17, p. 59-95].

4. The Feeling of Superiority Over the Enemy

The American soldiers' image of the enemy seems to portray four somewhat conflicting basic characteristics:

(a) That all military men are comrades in arms,
(b) That the enemy is a creature not human at all,
(c) That the enemy is a loathsome animal below a human level and an enemy of God thus making killing him a sacrificial act, and

(d) That the enemy is essentially a decent man who is temporarily misguided [Ref. 17, p. 131-169]. This stereotypical perception of the enemy has the potential for creating many motivation problems for the military services. For example, that which motivates a black soldier to willingly kill a Viet Cong soldier might certainly be different than motivating him to kill a black native in Africa. The image of superiority over the enemy is no longer true when one compares the overall strength, technology, and numbers of the Russian and Warsaw Pack countries with the United States and NATO.

5. Lack of Political Affiliation

. . . the composite picture leaves no doubt that the American soldier had neither strong beliefs about national war nor a highly developed sense of personal commitment to the war effort. . . . So it is again the primary group that is involved in explaining effective military performance [Ref. 34, p. 7].

6. Group Cohesion as a Motivator

Defense of this theme is best described by S. L. A. Marshall's statement that "I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry

soldier to keep going with his weapon is the near presence or the presumed presence of a comrade" [Ref. 24, p. 94]. This theme is further defended by Charles Moskos' analysis of the American soldier in Vietnam.

It (combat motivation) focuses attention instead on the role of face-to-face or "primary" groups, and explains the motivation of the individual combat soldier as a function of his solidarity and social intimacy with fellow soldiers at small group levels I argue that combat motivation arises out of the linkages between individuals self-concern, primary-group processes, and the shared beliefs of soldiers [Ref. 34, p. 135].

Another example of group cohesion in a combat environment concerns behavior while captured. Albert Biderman defended the behavior of American POW's in the Korean War by stressing that resistance was more a function of the peer relationships that existed within the camps between fellow prisoners than the orders, advice, and encouragement of seniors in rank [Ref. 7]. This premise is further supported by CDR Phillip Butler and his experience as a North Vietnamese POW for eight years.⁵ CDR Butler's experience also indicated that the influence of seniors in terms of rank was not the driving factor in regard to resistance to giving information and other POW activities including excruciating physical torture. What is most significant was

⁵ Information in support of this premise was obtained in a personal interview with CDR Phillip Butler on 28 Jan 1978. CDR Butler is a Human Resources Management Team Leader at Human Resources Management Center, San Diego, California.

the peer relationship among POW's--not leadership. POW's apparently do not need a command structure as much as they need a support group composed of peers.

D. CONTRIBUTIONS FROM ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Military sociology presents some of the macro problems facing society and the military establishment. Military history usually confines the study of the military environment to a more micro level because it focuses on the internal processes of the military and its unique mission of applying violence in a legalistic and moralistic setting. Other disciplines such as economics and psychology assist in further describing the independent variables affecting the all-volunteer force. These variables are presented here because they seem to have an important affect on the organizational development effort of military OD practitioners now and likely in the future as well.

Presently almost one-half of the defense budget is allocated for pay to 2.4 million active military personnel, 1.6 million retired military personnel, and 1 million civilian white-and-blue collar workers. The defense manpower costs for 1977 were 53 billion dollars. This payroll will probably continue to increase because of inflation and increased competition for scarce manpower resources caused by the ending of the draft and a steadily decreasing supply of prime recruiting candidates. In fact, manpower costs are projected to reach a minimum of 61 billion dollars by 1985

assuming no inflation and authorized force manning levels remain constant. In addition, the shortfall in available manpower is predicted to be 88,000 personnel assuming low unemployment and 53,000 personnel assuming high unemployment [Ref. 9, p. xi-xxiii].

The options which can be considered by the Department of Defense (DOD) to alleviate the scarce manpower situation appear to be limited. The most promising relief can be obtained by utilizing more women. The US Army presently has almost 50,000 female soldiers. This figure will increase to 50,400 females in 1979. This total will constitute 7 percent of the total army forces. The goal is to increase army strength to 81,000 females by 1983 which would mean 11 percent of the force would be comprised of females.

Given the projected manpower shortages in the future, it would appear senseless to ignore the 300,000 females who annually meet entrance requirements for military duty [Ref. 8, p. 14]. Future utilization of females is primarily dependent upon changes in federal law governing the use of females in combat positions. Currently, the civilian sector and the military sector continue to have a protectionist attitude toward females in combat roles.

This protectionist attitude might not be so appropriate in today's military. Albert Biderman points out that ". . . the risks of personal danger in the military are no greater than those in civilian life. In the military, the tasks which are purely military continually recede as the

institution becomes more and more technological and logistical" [Ref. 23, p. 15]. The protectionist attitude might also be outdated because of a ". . . decline in the proportion of the work force performing manual tasks.

Similarly, in the military sector, the proportion of personnel attached to ground combat and general duty military occupations has also declined" [Ref. 18, p.2]. Females have adequately demonstrated not only the willingness but also the capability to function in occupational positions traditionally reserved for males because of a perceived level of danger and physical differences [Ref. 8, p. 14].

Another option being considered by military planners and the House Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee is to increase the number of first termers from 50 percent to 60 percent. This has been recommended because it would save 2 billion dollars a year [Ref. 38, p. 4]. This recommendation appears rather optimistic given the predicted manpower shortages through 1985 and places an almost impossible burden on military recruiters. As the population decreases and unemployment decreases, as much as one-third of the required supply of eligible males simply will not be available to meet military manpower requirements. [Ref. 9, p. 43-45].

This situation, coupled with pressure to recruit qualified personnel and pressure to decrease the attrition rate, makes the job of the recruiter increasingly more difficult. There are approximately 18,000 military personnel involved in recruiting and they appear to have saturated almost all

population areas. The average cost to recruit an enlistee in fiscal year 1976 was \$1,240. The marginal cost to obtain each enlistee using the medium of additional recruiters is expected to be \$5,500 for 1978 [Ref. 9, p. 43-45]. These factors lead to the conclusion that across-the-board pay increases are not as effective as bonuses or selective pay raises in attracting and retaining military personnel [Ref. 18, p. 13].

Increasing the dependence on reserve forces is also an option being considered to relieve some of the manpower shortages for the active military. This alternative is certainly worthy of consideration but these same manpower shortages have plagued the reserve forces even more than the active forces. "Surprisingly, however, the critical problem is not recruitment, but retention" [Ref. 47, p. 14]. Recent reports indicate the reserve forces are 500,000 personnel short and the situation is getting increasingly worse [Ref. 41, p. 46].

The ending of the draft has caused a continual decline in reserve forces manning levels. This reserve segment of our National Defense increasingly relies on prior service personnel and has caused a top-heavy rank structure in order to meet minimum requirements. This rank imbalance, in turn, causes more expensive manpower costs and acts as an additional constraint in the efforts to stabilize manpower costs [Ref. 3]. Any increased recruiting for

Reserve Forces will, therefore, likely only intensify the competition between active and reserve military and the civilian sector for the same pool of resources.

Other economic considerations are beginning to impact on military manpower issues. The economic issue concerning the efficient distribution of labor and capital has received much attention and several economists have substantiated the fact that the military should accelerate the substitution of capital for labor. The United States has reversed the trend of the last decade and is progressing from a labor intensive environment to a capital intensive environment [Ref. 11].

The predominant motivation for this substitution trend is inflation and increasing manpower costs in our society. For the military, it simply means that it is cheaper to develop highly sophisticated and technical weapons and weapon support systems rather than use large quantities of people [Ref. 11]. High quality personnel are required to operate and maintain the weapon systems. These high quality personnel (mental category I, II, and III) are the very ones that the military is having the greatest difficulty attracting and retaining.

Perhaps the region of greatest impact on those military forces which heavily depend on sophisticated weapons is in the field of training. Presently at any given time approximately 18 percent of active duty military personnel are involved in training [Ref. 9, p. 8]. Any savings in this

area would obviously benefit the taxpayer. However this savings would accrue due to budgetary considerations only. Probably few people could argue the fact that the greater the technology, the greater the degree of specialization, and the greater the amount of training required to effectively use the technology which is available. Efforts to reduce training time, training personnel, and training overhead will become increasingly difficult assuming the military continues to replace obsolete weapons with more technically sophisticated and complex weapons.

Technological implications have already surfaced in several areas in this paper. The technology issue would not be complete without making some inferences to its effect in combat. Two general themes should be considered and represent polar extremes. First, technology has allowed the development of weapons that vary from small target destruction without even seeing the target to vast destruction encompassing literally hundreds of square miles. Secondly, no matter what the level of technology, individuals (traditionally ground combat forces) are required to occupy and defend the objective land areas. From the perspective of a ground combatant, it seems logical to assume that, even though the relative distance between combatants is increasing, the destructiveness and accuracy of weapons make the probability of death seemingly more imminent by comparison with past wars. This destruction-at-a-distance appears to be the purpose of the new weapons which are being introduced

into our military arsenals. The real question is, "Can this probability of death become so great that military personnel and prospective military personnel would resort to any means to avoid military service?"

There seems to be, in short, a wide area of combat variables which have thus far eluded understanding and description by classical military theorists. The interaction and modification of many of these variables is seen as a viable challenge to the field of organizational development.

E. ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT

Organization development is an effort (1) planned, (2) organization-wide, and (3) managed from the top, to (4) increase organizational effectiveness and health through (5) planned interventions in the organization's "processes," using behavioral-science knowledge [Ref. 6, p. 9].

Within the framework of this definition of organization development some rather significant problems become readily apparent when conducting an analysis of OD in a military environment and specifically a combat environment. First, the OD effort is planned, organization wide. This presents a basic management problem because of the immense size of the total organization. In the US Army, the total organization involves approximately 800,000 personnel and the several hundred thousand Department of the Army civilians. Secondly, the emphasis on management from the top is certainly apparent for the US Army [Ref. 39].

One major problem is that there are many organizational levels between the Chief of Staff and the soldiers and civilians who could benefit most from an OD effort. Progress is being made in many Army units toward acceptance of OD. It appears, however, that 275 trained consultants are not likely to be sufficient to insure every active army unit will benefit from the Organizational Effectiveness Program [Ref. 4].

Lastly, the utilization of behavioral-science knowledge presents some programmatic risks because the Army's Organization Effectiveness Staff Officer is trained "in a 16 week intensive and experiential based program at the OE Training Center" [Ref. 40, p. 4]. While this training program is intensive and comprehensive, the varying background of students does not compare favorably with the generally higher academic credentials and experience levels of most professional civilian OD consultants.

Organization development as practiced today involves numerous approaches and techniques aimed at the individual, team, intergroup, or total organization [Ref. 45]. The typical organizational processes the US Army is trying to improve through developmental efforts are communications, problem solving, coordination, decision making, goal setting, and planning. These processes are key elements in achieving combat readiness and mission accomplishment [Ref. 40, p. 10]. These largely human processes are consistent with OD efforts

in the civilian sector whose goals are often improved profitability, productivity, and services to stockholders, owners, and the general public.

The US Army's Organizational Effectiveness program is an attempt to incorporate within its own military framework the potential benefits of organization development. These benefits have been widely established in the civilian world. There are many similarities with both OD programs in a very broad sense. These similarities appear to exist largely because the Army is not currently involved in a war or similar type of police action. This peacetime setting allows the Organization Effectiveness Staff Officer (OESO) to conduct interventions in a rather static garrison environment.

Perhaps, the closest correlation to a more dynamic combat environment would be when the OESO has worked with units during field training exercises and command post exercises. Unfortunately, the reality is that these exercises are not combat. An enemy is not shooting live ammunition with intent to kill. No matter how realistic the training situation, the individual and organizational stress are not likely to be the same.

The subject of stress has gained increasing attention in the practice and writings of the field of organization development. Individual stress has traditionally been treated as a medical problem but the origination of stress is often found in the work setting in the form of role

ambiguity and interpersonal and intergroup conflicts. Thus, controlling stress in the work setting has been an increasingly important subject for OD practitioners. The identification of stress and its effect can often be measured or identified by the type of behavior a person exhibits. Some characteristics of healthy behavior include:

- (1) If you never suffer from a sense of urgency.
- (2) If you harbor no free-floating hostility nor display or discuss your achievements.
- (3) If you play for fun and relaxation or exhibit your superiority at any time.
- (4) If you relax without guilt, just as you can work without agitation.
- (5) Aware of your capabilities not what peers and superiors think [Ref. 12].⁶

Combat operations would probably cause most individuals involved to exhibit the characteristics of behavior which are diametrically opposite to those listed above. The most useful role of a OESO in this pressure filled situation would be to minimize the effects of stress. The OESO should encourage, as rapidly as possible, the return of organizational members to more healthy behavior.

Another ramification of stress concerns the quality of decisions made under simulated combat conditions. In a

⁶ For a more detailed description of Type A and Type B behavior see Friedman, M., and Rosenman, R., Type A Behavior and Your Heart, Alfred Knopf, New York, 1974. Additional sources of information on stress can be found in Seyle, H., Stress Without Distress, Lippincott, New York 1974; Adams, J., et al., Transitions, Allanheld, Osmun and Co., Montclair, New Jersey, 1976; and Adams, J., "Improving Stress Management," a paper presented at the OD Network, March 1978.

test conducted at Ft. Benning, Georgia, the essential components of a battalion (commander, staff, and four company commanders) were exposed to varying degrees of combat-like stress. Stress intensity was controlled through the frequency and urgency of message inputs to organizational leaders affecting their units under simulated combat conditions.

The test results indicate that the quality of decision under medium stress was significantly less than the quality of decisions made under low and high stress [Ref. 36]. Possible alternatives for OESOs and other OD practitioners are to decrease the stress where health is an issue but increase the stress above the medium level when the pace of combat does not allow it to be lowered. Based upon the data generated by this study, under managed stress, the quality of the decision, mission accomplishment, and minimizing losses would likely be enhanced.

A basic model underlying most organization development activities is the action research model--a data-based, problem-solving model that replicates the steps involved in the scientific method inquiry. Three processes are involved in action research: data collection, feedback of the data to the clients, and action planning based on the data. Action research is both an approach to problem solving--a model or a paradigm, and a problem-solving process--a series of activities and events [Ref. 15, p. 84].

A critical question is whether the OESO or other military OD practitioners will have the luxury of trying to accomplish data collection, feedback, and action planning under combat conditions. OD efforts undertaken in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 indicate that:

The common OD assumptions cannot be met, and change cannot be expected to be durable which, as Seashore and Bowers (1963) imply, would make the psychologist's effort "futile." Indeed, we maintain that common OD is futile as far as organizational emergency is concerned. However, the psychologist can serve a vital function in helping the organization cope with emergency, provided that the orientation, contents, processes, work methods, and outcome criteria are changed [Ref. 5, p. 7].

There is an opposing view to the usefulness of OD consultants in combat, which again, is based on experience during the Yom Kippur War. "The basic supposition. . . is that social-psychological intervention in wartime must be based on organization development, action research, and crisis intervention" [Ref. 16, p. 8]. Greenbaum et al do concede that the most important function of the OD consultant is before and after battle. "Except for unusual circumstances, the professional role of the psychologist during actual battle is very limited" [Ref. 16, p. 15-16].

In addition to the benefits of OD during the Yom Kippur War, many other incidents have occurred which highlight the potential benefits of OD in combat and other stressful conditions. A classic example is the US Marine unit called Carlson's Raiders.⁷ The combat achievements of

⁷ This is supposedly a factual experience but the author could find no written reference to Carlson's Raiders in any publications.

this unit are unparalleled in terms of combat successes while losing so few marines. The successes of this unit are reputed to be a function of (1) participative planning processes for combat, (2) extensive team building and training, (3) strong group identity and cohesion, (4) first name relationships among both officers and enlisted men, and (5) immediate de-briefings after combat to process the lessons learned and analysis for future operations. Ironically, this unit was reportedly disbanded because its methods were far too radical for the traditional marine image.

Another example, somewhat out of the context of OD, is the Cuban Missile Crisis. Graham Allison [Ref. 2] presents a very detailed analysis of the personalities and events which represent one of this civilization's closest encounters with a nuclear holocaust. President Kennedy's leadership during this crisis proved to be correct in spite of an earlier failure in an encounter with the Cuban government during the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Irving Janis [Ref. 21] explains some of the basic reasons why the Cuban Missile Crisis was a success while the Bay of Pigs invasion was not. During the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy's leadership was seen as everpresent and domineering. This overweening leadership apparently resulted in the lack of critical thinking to the extent that experts did not offer their recommendations and a wrong decision was made.


The Cuban Missile Crisis is an excellent contrast where utilization of some of the basic tenets of OD was obvious. First, the President's role was passive in the decision making process and all of the members of the executive committee were allowed to process all information without being inhibited. The results were the correct decisions were made and nuclear war was prevented.

The military services have used organization development to help create a level of readiness in a static garrison atmosphere. However, the level of readiness is a complex measure consisting of both the availability and operability of equipment as well as the optimum number of personnel with the required rank and skills to accomplish their combat mission. The skills needed to accomplish the mission are a function of both the training received and the management of the personnel in the training environment. The deployment of combat ready units to a combat zone, typically means that the units so employed have the capability to perform as trained--it does not necessarily mean that the units will actually perform as trained. The following model (Figure 1) is a graphic representation of the levels of readiness and effectiveness and the broad categories of variables affecting the levels.

The transition from a force in readiness to one that achieves final combat effectiveness is often a difficult movement. The ready force must move through an apparent barrier caused by changes in the individual combatant's

FIGURE 1

A MILITARY MODEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT



values. Clearly the probability of death (to self and/or others) creates questions and conflict distinctly different from that characteristic of the garrison stance. Lack of popular support, little or no political affiliation, changing social attitudes toward responsibility to serve, death, and other issues will likely be surfaced when combat is inevitable.

The key point in this model (Figure 1) is that OD has been used to help develop desired levels of combat readiness. This development has been accomplished through process. The process or the way things get done is distinguished from the task or what things get done. This focus on process is an essential element OD practitioners have used both to improve the organization and to improve the individuals that comprise the organization. This same process emphasis is viewed as an essential ingredient of final combat effectiveness. It appears that OESOs should be prepared to continue to assist units in utilizing this process function.

Further examples can best be presented by asking what the probable result of military operations would have been if an OD consultant had surfaced those sensitive process issues which always seem to hinder military missions. S. L. A. Marshall's writings in Vietnam frequently point out the personality conflicts between commanders, support elements, and between soldiers within the same unit. Perhaps, just a few minutes of process, correctly done,

might have prevented the loss of life and insured better accomplishment of those unpleasant missions. The interaction of the major services in ad hoc, new staff organizations such as MACV might have profited from skilled structural and process consultations.

III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

When the US Army undertook opinion surveys to facilitate planning for the volunteer force, results underlined the obvious conclusion that meaningful work was a very important element of satisfaction for enlisted personnel [Ref. 23, p. 20].

Virtually all of the military services have advertising programs using all types of media to attract potential applicants. Military recruiters have now saturated almost all geographical areas to the point they are in intense competition with each other. Unfortunately, these advertising messages and recruiters efforts apparently cannot compete with the impact of derogatory statements being made by family members, peer groups, and personnel recently discharged from the military. One of the primary reasons ". . . is that young men who are not disposed to join the services come from homes that hold the military in rather low esteem. They cite low status, low prestige of military education, family separation, danger and the bad experiences fathers had in the service" [Ref. 41, p. 34]. If these personal messages convey a negative picture of the military, it is likely that no amount of advertising or recruiter effort will effectively change the perception of military life by potential applicants.

A. SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE

American society at large appears to have concluded that military service is no longer a mandated individual responsibility. Thus it is a perfectly acceptable course of action for young people not to serve the military in any capacity. Historically, serving in the military services during times of national emergency and war has been both a desirable and expected duty. However, any controversial military intervention remotely resembling the Korean War or military actions similar to Vietnam would probably revive the anti-military sentiment which was so prevalent during the late 1960's and early 1970's.

B. THE IDEAL SETTING

For purposes of discussion, an ideal military setting is defined as one in which: (1) Military service is considered by the populace to be at least passively acceptable and desirable. (2) The required quantity and quality of military personnel are available to meet the current manning levels. (3) The management and leadership styles of service members have evolved over a period of time which is, for comparative purposes, essentially representative of society in general. (4) The predominant climate within all military organizations is one where all personnel have the opportunity to participate and have some control over their activities.

This list of factors of course, represents an ideal organization. Characteristically, this organization would be considered healthy by organizational theorists because it is proactive, has well understood and clearly defined missions, and individuals at all levels feel they are making a meaningful contribution to planning, training, and implementation of all activities. This idealized situation represents the available potential for developing organizations in accordance with the programs presently being instituted under the tenets of Organizational Development.

Presently, there are no known wars or other hostile activities in which US servicemen are actively involved. Let's assume the ideal unit having characteristics described above was taken out of its relatively sterile environment and suddenly placed in a combat role. By its very nature, combat causes the intensity of activities and individual feelings to change.

At a minimum, feelings of self-preservation, as frequently noted in the writings of S. L. A. Marshall, would probably take precedence over organizational preservation. Other traditional responses to a combat environment might include: (1) a perceived lack of assistance from support elements, e.g. air support, artillery fire, and logistics; and (2) a feeling of being unfairly treated because the majority of the people involved are support oriented and do not suffer the agony of being shot at or closely engaged with the enemy. While this intergroup conflict may be

considered a severe limitation for all the forces involved in combat operations, it is also an asset in developing group cohesion at lower levels within an organization. These conflicts have obvious consequences for commanders at all levels involved. The probability is very high that the superiors will resort to a traditional autocratic leadership style that has proven effective in the past. Notably, this style is diametrically opposite of the situation we have described as being ideal.

Table 2 presents some of the organizational effectiveness problems and the activities or techniques which should help maintain minimum levels of effectiveness for military units at various levels under combat conditions.

C. THE BASIC PROBLEM

If we could gain only a modicum of greater wisdom concerning what manner of men we are, what effect might it not have on future events [Ref. 17, p. 2⁴].

"Let's-focus-on-what-you-can-do-in-your-own-organization" is a frequently used expression for organization development consultants [Ref. 14, p. 1]. This does put the problem in the "here and now" and focuses on those things internal to an organization. In a combat environment, the issue might very well be "I don't want to kill someone because that is the way I was raised." Communication, team building, and many other OD techniques are useless when the primary life threatening issues are being ignored.

TABLE 2

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS PROBLEMS AND ACTIVITIES AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF ORGANIZATION

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS PROBLEMS	POSSIBLE ACTIVITIES OF THE OESO
<p>The change from relative service autonomy to multi-service organizations creates problems of:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Authority and power--more coordination is necessary before exercising authority and power. 2. Decision-making procedures--the complexity increases as the number of different services and support activities increase. 3. Communication norms--the written and spoken word must be relatively free of service unique acronyms and abbreviations. The creation of joint task forces requires senior officers to communicate in new ways outside their own subculture. 4. Developing control and responsibility systems--standard control and reporting systems must be expanded and modified to insure minimum amounts of duplication and all requirements for information and intelligence are met. 5. Problem solving--traditional problem-solving methods may have to be expanded or altered to insure all services are given the opportunity to provide input data. 6. Conflict resolution--the dynamics of the combat situation will probably not allow all conflicts to be resolved by the senior commander. Intergruop conflict resolution methods must be implemented. 	<p>The OD approaches and techniques would be concentrated on either individual, team, intergroup, or the total organization. Team building and conflict management/resolution would probably be given highest priorities. OD consultants with macro level experience would be needed to predict interservice breakdowns in communication and structural organizational weaknesses. OESOs might easily find themselves working to combat a "Group Think" mentality as major operation plans are created.</p>

JOINT SERVICE LEVEL

TABLE 2 CONTINUED

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS PROBLEMS	POSSIBLE ACTIVITIES OF THE OESO
<p>The rapid build-up of new units, adjusting to "tent" living, prioritization of missions, new tactical standard operating procedures and integrating national guard and reserve forces create problems of:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Authority and power 2. Conflicting roles of units--units are trained as combatants but may be required to exercise restraint according to the rules of engagement. 3. Competition for resources 4. Communication norms--most units have standard operating procedures which must be changed so external activities can understand the messages. 5. Command and Control--divisions have had the opportunity for autonomy in the garrison state. In combat they will have to adjust to less autonomy and close liaison with other corp units. 	<p>The OESO will not have the time for extensive diagnosis and validation. The role of the OESO begins to change more to a general management consultant vice a facilitator. The process facilitation should include efforts to insure as much information as possible that is surfaced and expert sources of information are developed and used in the decision-making process. A third party observer may find that key detachment heads are systematically being excluded from discussions and planning processes. Again, a viable function of the OESO may be to force the surfacing of underlying differences in assumptions of division commanders.</p>

COOP LEVEL

TABLE 2 CONTINUED

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS PROBLEMS	POSSIBLE ACTIVITIES OF THE OESO
<p>Previous autonomy or previous independence from higher authority is absent because of the need for more coordination in support of common missions. Problems include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. New bureaucratic control and reporting procedures. 2. Competition between units for supporting activities. 3. Requirements for much more lateral coordination. 	<p>The combat mission is changing rapidly and the OESOs expertise in organizational systems could best be utilized at interface points between units rather than concentrating on internal organizational issues. Team building, interdisciplinary task teams, goal setting, and individual consultation are likely activities for the OESO.</p>
<p>The relationships with higher authority will probably not change significantly. However, the rapid attachment and detachment of units creates problems of:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Unit identity and integrity 2. Command and control methods 3. Adjusting to changing management styles 	<p>This level affords the OESO an opportunity to continue operating in a manner in which he has been trained and, initially, working with units he knows. Planning for combat operations could be facilitated through process consultation and team building. After operation debriefing for order of battle intelligence and lessons learned well also be useful activities for the OESO. To date it is not an assigned task of any brigade staff officer to oversee the loose ends of broken communications and problems associated with fragmenting of organizations.</p>

DIVISION LEVEL

BRIGADE LEVEL

TABLE 2 CONTINUED

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS PROBLEMS	POSSIBLE ACTIVITIES OF THE OESO
<p>This level is where the dynamics of combat are most apparent. Problems include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Losses of critical personnel and equipment. 2. Defeats and overwhelming enemy superiority. 3. Frequently altering group make-up and integrating new group members. 4. Transitions to new commanders and new group leaders. 5. Intergroup confrontations to establish support and assistance roles under combat. 	<p>This level is perhaps the most critical to the OESO but represents the area of <u>least expertise</u>. The specific areas are psychological in nature, and involve the issues of death,⁹ POW's, injuries, fatigue, stress, and combat motivation. The OESO's greatest use would be in advising commanders on what to say to their soldiers and when and how to say it. The ethical question of confidentiality with clients will probably surface at this level. The OESO should create an understanding with his clients so that pertinent information can be disclosed to higher authority even if the disclosure acts to the detriment of the client or client organization. It is absolutely crucial that OESOs assigned at this level be credible as professional, combat oriented officers.</p>

⁹ The subject of death is becoming an issue for OD practitioners in the civilian world. The Spring 1978 OD Network presented a workshop by Billy Alban and Gail Silverman on death.

OD in the military is a massive attempt to institutionalize change. This change is virtually impossible in a short period of time. Social change usually involves a process of socialization and it is thankfully, often painfully slow. Perhaps it should be slow because the slower the process, the more quickly the change can be reacted to and reversed if the trend is incorrect. One test of social change is whether it can be measured in an individual's behavior. To quantify these changes in organizational functioning, is what OD consultants attempt to use to justify their existence. If the needed change is environmental or external, why try to deal with it if one cannot change it. If one cannot change the environment, perhaps the change effort should be centered around creating an internal understanding of the difficulty and try to develop a capability to live with the constraint rather than wasting valuable energy in the form of resistance.

This leads us to the basic problems of applying organization development in a combat environment. First, our normative models of OD might not be appropriate to contribute to the success of military operations. Secondly, OD consultants can not be sure what the real issues are. Therefore, they should be prepared to deal with the problems of death, combat, separation, and casualties before, during, and after battle. Thirdly, the ideal organization that has been developed in the sterile, garrison environment may not be able to function as it ideally should. It is

likely that the dynamics of combat and a change to a more autocratic leadership style will have caused the unit to develop a different personality.

What was once a bureaucratic element in an impersonal organization can now be a cohesive, virile entity, thrust into a terrifying and dehumanizing environment. The acid test is whether or not this new unit with new ways of communicating, motivating, and deciding its direction can operate effectively in combat. Simply stated: Why should the US military implement OD programs if they will not be used in a combat environment? Finally, consultant efforts are centered around group processes when in fact "a man under pressure, particularly an emergent leader, can use advice" [Ref. 30, p. 164].

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSION

The underlying problem of using organization development in combat stems from the assumption of some influential military decision makers that OD should be but probably will not be used in combat. If past history is a guide, the strong tendency will be for commanders to regress to the more traditional methods of leadership that were successful during World War II, the Korean War, and to a more questionable extent, the war in Vietnam.

B. ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS

The final combat effectiveness issue and the utilization of OESOs in combat can present several different strategies or alternatives. Three possible strategies have been identified that represent a continuum from non-use to full use of the OESO in combat.

1. The Decision Not to Use OD Principles or OESOs in Combat

OD has never been used, in a literal sense, to support combat operations for the US Armed Forces. Many veteran commanders would probably argue that because OD has never been tested and proven in combat, it should not be used at all. Combat is characteristically an activity

requiring quick decisive action. The participative, collaborative management and leadership styles would likely be seen as inconsistent with the demands of the combat situation. The potential danger is the force in readiness which was created in the relatively static garrison environment may not function as well in the combat setting. This strategy includes using the OESO as an additional manpower resource in his/her warfare speciality as an impending combat situation is forecasted. The gains might include speedier decisions with less concern as to whether the organization is functioning well. The cost might include lower quality decisions and considerable organizational waste which would go unchecked and unnoticed.

2. The Decision To Use OD And OESOs But Abandon The Effort Should It Prove Ineffective or Dysfunctional

Again, the use of OD and OESOs have not been tested in combat and the reaction to OD and OESOs is currently unknown. In this alternative, planning for use of OD and OESOs in combat is based on the criterion of demonstrated effectiveness. First, continue to use OD if it is effective, and secondly, abandon OD should it become ineffective.

This alternative might lead to two divergent conclusions. However, it is consistent with current contingency views of organizations and management [Ref. 20]. The move from a force in readiness to final combat effectiveness may

compare with a transition from prototype production to mass production in the civilian world. Empirical evidence indicates that "mass production was more successful with classical design, whereas unit and process production were more successful when they used humanistic designs" [Ref. 20, p. 425]. The transition also indicates changes from a stable to a dynamic environment.

They (Lawrence and Lorsch)⁸ showed that in certain stable environments the classical forms tend to be more effective. In changing environments the opposite is true. More humanistic forms are required to permit organizations to respond effectively to their unstable environments [Ref. 20, p. 426].

One important dilemma for the OESO is how to facilitate the change in leadership styles from classical to humanistic and vice versa. Another important dilemma for OESOs is recognizing when traditional styles of leadership would compliment the organization's mission and also when more humanistic styles of leadership are more appropriate.

3. Demand That OD Principles and OESOs be Used in Combat

This is the alternative that is advocated in this thesis. OD has been successfully used in a military setting for a number of years now and OD technology has developed

⁸ See Lawrence, P., and Lorsch, J., Organization and Environment, Irwin, Homewood, Illinois, 1969.

sufficient maturity to indicate its probable success in combat. The organizational issues will be somewhat different and likely require greater urgency but the process is the same--namely that the group dynamics, cohesion, and intergroup understanding are as important as the group task in combat. The evidence is overwhelming. Group cohesion musters firepower.

C. HOW OESOs MIGHT BE USED IN COMBAT

The OESOs primary use in combat should be as a participant observer. The dynamics of the situation do not allow adequate time for extensive involvement with combat units or subgroups within combat units. The role of participant observer would be maximized when the OESO is sufficiently removed from the situation to retain some semblance of outside objectivity. He should, however, remain close enough to be credible. He should use his knowledge of organizational systems to inform commanders and make recommendations on how the status of interpersonal relationships within organizations are affecting the combat mission.

The role of participant observer will likely be extremely critical during the initial stages of deployment and during the first combat operation. The nature of the combat situation will probably be established during the first engagements. Proper processing of this combat status information and the analysis of its effect on soldiers can be useful in preparing other units who have not yet been under fire.

Use of the OESO as a participant observer should not be limited only to actual combat operations. The US military is frequently used to assist the civilian population in natural disasters and other emergencies such as riots. The OESO should have unlimited freedom to involve himself in any phase of the emergency situation. The purpose of this mobility is not primarily intelligence gathering. The OESO may best serve by using his knowledge of organizational systems and data gathering abilities to make recommendations on how to most appropriately employ military units and the level of restraint which is most consistent with the situation.

Historical examples are abundant. One relevant question is related to the eventual outcome of the Kent State incident. It possibly could have been avoided if a participant observer (OESO) had been involved in the crucial decision making processes. These decisions concerned a determination of the most effective civil disturbance tactics to be employed and the policy for the use of live ammunition.

The treatment of POW's is also a potential issue in which an OESO may be effective. This treatment question is particularly important during the initial stages of hostilities. If proper and humane treatment of POW's become a norm during the initial stages of combat, perhaps the communist treatment of American POW's during Korea and Vietnam would have been different. The OESO may also be effective in dealing with the POW issue beyond simply a front line

rationale. He may be able to help with representing to decision makers the organizational and political benefits of fair treatment upon which may hinge the nation's worldwide reputation.

Civil-military relations are not only important in the United States and other host countries where US forces are engaged in combat. The interactions of US military forces with the local populace and displaced refugees will likely be the single most important factor in creating local (host country) support of combat operations. The OESO could be instrumental in removing the stereotypical "GOOK" or dumb foreigner image. This would involve a role of explaining to friendly troops the cultural differences between American society and those of the other countries involved in the conflict. The ultimate goal of this work is not to force American standards on other countries but to create a level of acceptance of other cultures which ultimately compliments the joint war effort.⁹

The breakout of hostilities traditionally involves the activation of new military units. The OESO can serve a useful purpose in developing organizations and shortening the time required for groups to establish effective working relationships. New units would also benefit if the OESO was recently returned from combat and had first hand

⁹ A more detailed analysis of civil-military relations can be found in Lovell, J., and Kronenberg, P., New Civil-Military Relations, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1974.

knowledge of organizational processes which are best suited for supporting the war effort.

One very telling characteristic of units involved in combat or other emergency operations is the tendency to ignore the requirements for routine, unimportant reports that do not support the combat mission. Combat usually creates an elite sub-culture within the military units involved (Gemeinschaft) which is apparently inconsistent with the more bureaucratic processes (Gesellschaft) of the entire military community [Ref. 43, p. 54-62]. The OESO can be effective in explaining the nature of the breakdown and helping to develop alternate means of obtaining the desired information. Perhaps, simply creating some understanding of the need for Gemeinschaft in combat units could contribute toward reducing dysfunctional resistance between supported and supporting activities.

Frequently in combat a phenomenon of fighting breaks out in R&R centers in the rear areas. Gemeinschaft units rebel against the apparent aloofness of Gesellschaft environments. An OESO might well explain to Gesellschaft commanders who are prepared to court-martial the more cohesive brawlers just what is really taking place. It is not inconsequential that someone should moderate bureaucratic demands such as keeping computer card reports dry during a monsoon or that someone should re-route the beer truck to visit the front line units before scattering its cargo to the supporting units. Nor is it inconsequential

that little effort is spent on making clear the mission of the support units. An OESO would not lack an agenda upon which to work.

Units in need of personnel replacements also exhibit characteristics of Gemeinschaft behavior. The personnel support system usually requires extensive documentation. This documentation is perceived by Gemeinschaft commanders as catering to the Gesellschaft activities who control the personnel support system. Commanders of Gemeinschaft units resist the formal, official, written documentation because it does not contribute to the combat mission. Unfortunately, the results are replacements are not expeditiously assigned to units and the necessary group processes are not adequately accomplished prior to new combat operations.

The OESO will also be confronted with moral-ethical problems. Under non-combat conditions, the OESO primarily is trained in using a "truth, goodness, and light" philosophy that involves absolute confidentiality within organizations. Under combat conditions, he will probably be forced to disclose information to activities outside the client organization. One illustration is the disclosure of confidential information that can manifest itself in the form of recommendations for relief from command when incompetency, fatigue, stress, and other factors render a commander ineffective. Unfortunately, this practice might cause withholding of useful information for future operations.

D. SUMMARY

Further listings and examples of using OESOs in combat operations are numerous. Whether the examples involve "back home" support, on the battlefield, or in a field hospital, the message is simply that the potential benefits of using OD and OESOs in combat appear to far outweigh the risks.

E. RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

There are numerous field training exercises and command post exercises conducted each year in the United States and in foreign countries where US servicemen are stationed. These exercises represent as closely as possible the dynamics of combat with the aid of devices and activities providing a great deal of realism. This thesis recommends an extensive evaluation of the results of these exercises under two approaches. First, evaluate units who have not had the benefit of OD and secondly, evaluate units who have had extensive training in OD and who go into the exercises with OESOs working as OESOs. The hypothesis to be tested is that units who use OD and OESOs will have better morale, better performance records, and better intergroup and intragroup processes which contribute to mission accomplishment with minimum loss of lives than similar units which have not.

It is the author's view that the issue of the use of the OESO resource in combat is of sufficient importance so as to warrant an immediate test by the US Army.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Adams, J., Hayes, J., and Hopson, B., Transition, Allanheld, Osmun & Co., Montclair, New Jersey, 1977.
2. Allison, G., Essence of Decision, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1971.
3. "Annual Report on Reserve Forces to the President and The Congress for Fiscal Year 1976 and Transition Quarter," Washington, D. C., August 15, 1977.
4. "Army-Wide OE Update," OE Communique, Fort Ord, California, October 1977.
5. Babad, E., and Solomon, G., "Professional Dilemmas of the Psychologist in Organizational Emergency," School of Education, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, undated.
6. Beckhard, J., Organization Development: Strategies and Models, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1969.
7. Biderman, A., March to Calumny, Macmillan Company, New York, 1963.
8. Blumenson, M., "The Army's Women Move Out," Army, v. 28, no. 2, p. 14-25, February, 1978.
9. Congressional Budget Office, The Costs of Defense Manpower: Issues for 1977, Washington, D. C., January 1977.
10. Cooper, R., "The Social Cost of Maintaining a Military Labor Force," The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, July 1975.
11. Cooper, R., and Roll, C., "The Allocation of Military Resources: Implications for Capital-Labor Substitution," The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, June 1973.
12. Fisher, W., "Stress Management Workshop," Organizational Effectiveness Training Center, Fort Ord, California.
13. Forbes, R., "Influencing Bureaucratic Macrosystems: Theory and Strategy for Organizational Change," Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, April 1978.
14. Forbes, R., "Organizational Development: The Case for an Ecological Approach," Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 1978.

15. French, W., and Bell, C., Organization Development, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1973.
16. Greenbaum, C., Rogovsky, I., and Shalit, B., "The Military Psychologist During Wartime: A Model Based on Action Research and Crisis Intervention," The Journal of Applied Behavior Science, v. 13, no. 1, p. 7-21, January 1977.
17. Grey, J., The Warriors, Harcourt, Brace & Company, New York, 1959.
18. Haber, S. E., "Occupational Structure in the Military and Civilian Sectors of the Economy," Technical Report No. TR-1224, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, George Washington University, September 25, 1974.
19. Hemingway, E., In Our Time, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1925.
20. Hicks, H., and Gullett, C., Organizations: Theory and Behavior, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1975.
21. Janis, I., Victims of Groupthink, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, Massachusetts, 1972.
22. Janowitz, M., The Professional Soldier, Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1960.
23. Janowitz, M., The U. S. Forces and the Zero Draft, Adelphi Papers Number Ninety-four, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, January 1973.
24. Janowitz, M. in collaboration with Little, R. W., Sociology and the Military Establishment, 3d ed., Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, California, 1974.
25. Keegan, J., The Face of Battle, Vintage Books, New York, 1977.
26. Lang, K., Military Institutions and the Sociology of War, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, California, 1972.
27. Lawrence, P., and Lorsch, J., Developing Organizations: Diagnosis and Action, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1969.
28. Lewy, G., "The Punishment of Atrocities of War Crimes in Vietnam," Inter-University Seminar, Chicago, Illinois, undated.
29. Lovell, J. and Kronenberg, P., New Civil-Military Relations, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1974.

30. Marshall, S., Ambush, Cowles Book Company, New York, 1969.
31. Marshall, S., Battle at Best, William Morrow and Co., New York, 1963.
32. Marshall, S., Battles in the Monsoon, William Morrow and Co., New York, 1967.
33. Marshall, S., Men Against Fire, William Morrow, New York, 1947.
34. Moskos, C., The American Enlisted Man, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1970.
35. Moskos, C., "The Emergent Military: Civil, Traditional, or Plural?" Pacific Sociological Review, v. 16, no. 2, p. 255-280, April 1973.
36. Olmstead, J., "Components of Organizational Competence: Test of a Conceptual Framework," Hum RRO, Technical Report Number 73-19, Alexandria, Virginia, August 1973.
37. O'Sullivan, J. and Mechkler, A., The Draft and Its Enemies, University of Illinois, Chicago, Illinois, 1974.
38. "Rand Corp. Finds Help for All-Vol," Army Times, p. 4, February 20, 1978.
39. Rogers, B., "Organizational Effectiveness," letter dated 21 September 1977 from the U. S. Army Chief of Staff.
40. Schaum, F., "The Strategy and Practical Realities of Organization Development (OD) in the U. S. Army," a draft paper written for publication in the Southern Review of Public Administration.
41. Smith, P., "Popularity of Services Still Sliding," Army Times, p. 34, April 24, 1978.
42. Stouffer, S. A., and others, The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life, v. 1, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1949.
43. Toennies, F., "From Community to Society," in Etzioni, A., and Etzioni-Halevy, E., Social Change, 2d ed., Basic Books, New York, 1973.
44. Van Doorn, J., The Soldier and Social Change, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, California, 1975.
45. Varney, G., Organization Development for Managers, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1977.

46. Wachter, M., "Second Thoughts About Illegal Immigrants," Fortune, v. 97, no. 10, p. 80-87, May 22, 1978.
47. Werner, R., "The Other Military: U. S. Reserve Components," Inter-University Seminars, Chicago, undated.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

	No. Copies
1. Defense Documentation Center Cameron Station Alexandria, VA 22314	2
2. Command and General Staff College ATTN: Educational Advisor Room 123, Bell Hall Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027	1
3. Library, Code 0142 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93940	2
4. CDR R. A. McGonigal, Code 54 Department of Administrative Sciences Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93940	1
5. LCDR R. L. Forbes, Code 54 Department of Administrative Sciences Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93940	1
6. CPT. William D. Langford 277 Young Circle Marina, CA 93933	1
7. LTC James F. Loooram USAOETC Fort Ord, CA 93941	1
8. COL D. M. Malone HQ TRADOC ATTN: ATCS-OE Fort Monroe, VA 23651	1
9. LTC Fred W. Schaum HQ DA, Office of Chief of Staff Room 3D 640 Pentagon Washington D. C. 20310	1
10. LTC Gerald D. Pike USAOETC Fort Ord, CA 93941	1

11. Chief of Naval Personnel (PERS-6/OP-01P) 1
Navy Department
Washington, D.C. 20370
12. Chief of Naval Personnel (PERS-62) 1
Navy Department
Washington, D.C. 20370
13. Chief of Naval Tech Training 1
HRM School
NAS Memphis (75)
Millington, Tennessee 38054
14. Professor Morris Janowitz 1
Secretarial
Social Science Building
University of Chicago
1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, Illinois 60637